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POWERS -TESTAMENTARY POWER - ENFORCEABILITY OF CONTRACT
TO EXERCISE - Charles Wetmore and Morgan Kent, beneficiaries of a trust
under the will of their mother which was probated in 1913, entered into an
agreement whereby Kent agreed, inter alia, to devise one ninth of the corpus of
the estate to Kent's children living at the time of his death in consideration ofa
promise by Wetmore to exercise a testamentary power of appointment given by
the will of the testatrix over one sixth of the corpus in favor of Kent, or if he be
deceased at the time W etmore's will became effective, in favor of such persons
as Kent should by will direct. The parties to the agreement also exchanged
bonds for the performance of the contract. Kent died in 1939 leaving a will
which complied with the agreement made by him and Wetmore. Wetmore died
in 1941 exercising the power in favor of his son in violation of the terms of the
agreement. Plaintiff, executor of Kent's will, brings this action against the
executors of W etmore's will, demanding that W etmore's estate be impressed
with a trust to the value of the property passing under the power or in the alternative for judgment upon a bond for $ I 00,000 given to secure performance of
the contract. Held, the contract was invalid as undertaking to bind Wetmore
in advance of his death to the exercise of a testamentary power in a certain
manner. Nor-can the bond be made the basis of a recovery of damages, since
it was made pursuan_t to an unenforceable contract. Kent v. Thornton, 179
Misc. 593, 39 N.Y.S. (2d) 435 (1942).
It is generally stated as a rule of law that the donee of a testamentary power
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of appointment can exercise it in no way other than by will.1 The reason generally given for this rule is that the donor of the power expected the donee to
retain his discretion and judgment to the end of his life and to exercise the same
in the light of whatever changes of circumstances might occur.2 This intent may
be defeated if the donee is permitted to appoint in his lifetime. For the same
reasons, the courts have frowned on contracts by donees of a testamentary power
of appointment to appoint to a particular person or in a certain way, and have
unanimously refused specific performance of their provisions. 8 On the question
of damages for breach of the contract to appoint, there has been division of
opinion between the English and American courts, the only other American
case on this precise point also refusing an action for breach of contract. 4 These
courts have felt that knowledge of the fact that his estate would be liable for
damages would make the donee reluctant to breach the contract to appoint and
thus indirectly the free exercise of judgment intended by the testator would be
prevented. Yet both the English and American courts have not hesitated to
disregard the testator's intent in permitting the release of general testamentary
powers of appointment. 5 And property passing under a general testamentary
power is liable for the debts of the donee once an appointment has been made. 6
1
Wilks v. Burns, 60 Md. 64 (1882); Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Mortimer,
219 N.Y. 290, II4 N.E. 389 (1916); Hood v. Haden, 82 Va. 588 (1886).
2 Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Mortimer, 219 N.Y. 290, I 14 N.E. 389 (1916);
Northern Trust Co. v. Porter, 368 Ill. 256, 13 N.E. (2d) 487 (1938).
8
Wilks-v. Burns, 60 Md. 64 (1882); Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Mortimer,
219 N.Y. 290, 114 N.E. 389 (1916).
4
Northern Trust Co. v. Porter, 368 Ill. 256, 13 N.E. (2d) 487 (1938), noted
51 HARV. L. REV. 1451 (1938), 16 CHI-KENT L. REV. 298 (1938), 13 NOTRE
DAME LAWY, 308 (1938); 3 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, § 340 (1940). The only
English cases permit damages for breach of contract. In re Parkin, [ I 892] 3 Ch.
510; Coffin v. Cooper, 2 Drew & Sm. 365 at 376, 62 Eng. Rep. 66.o (1865); Re
Collard and Duckworth, 16 Ont. 735 (1889).
5
Gray, "Release and Discharge of Powers," 24 HARV. L. REv. 5II (19II). It
is generally said that all powers except special powers collateral are releasable. It has
been suggested, however, that releasability really depends on whether the special power
is or is not in trust, not on whether it is appendant, in gross, or purely collateral. I
SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS, §§ 280, 28 I ( I 93 5)•.
6
Clapp v. Ingraham, 126 Mass. 200 (1879); Stratton v. United States, (C.C.A.
1st, 1931) 50 F. (2d) 48, cert. denied 284 U.S. 651, 52 S. Ct. 31 (1931); Johnson
v. Cushing, 15 N.H. 298 (1844); cases collected in 59 A.L.R. 1510 (1929), 97
A.L.R. 107 l ( l 93 5). To the effect that this doctrine is inapplicable to a general
power of appointment by will only, see Leser v. Burnet, (C.C.A. 4th, 1931) 46 F.
(2d) 756; Wales' Administrator v. Bowdish's Executor, 61 Vt. 23, 17 A. 1000
(1888). A vocal minority is represented in Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v.
Anthony, 49 R.I. 339, 142 A. 531 (1928); St. Matthews Bank v. De Charette, 259
Ky. 802, 83 S.W. (2d) 471 (1935); Prince de Beam v. Winans, II 1 Md. 434, 74
A. 626 (1909); Commonwealth v. Duffield, 12 Pa. St. 277 (1849). The decisions of
the majority may be justified in part by the fact that the nonexercise of a power is in
reality a kind of exercise after all, and hence the doctrine of Clapp v. Ingraham does
not coerce the donee in every respect and still leaves him free to "appoint" to the
taker in default free from the donee's personal obligations. On the other hand, if
damages were given to the promisee of a contract to appoint, a pressure would be
exercised both on the exercise and the nonexercise of the power.
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Yet the existence of these anomalies in the law of powers should not detract from
the soundness of the decision in the principal case, which is clearly in furtherance
of the testator's intent. In addition, the harsh effect of such holdings on the
promisee is lessened by the fact that restitution is available to him as a remedy and
he may be reimbursed to the extent of the value he has given, even out of the
property passing under the power if the personal assets of the donee are insufficient to satisfy his claim. 7
Hobart Taylor, fr.

7

Vinton v. Pratt, 228 Mass. 468, 117 N.E. 919 (1917); 3 PROPERTY RE329 (1940).
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